Abstract. This paper develops and implements a nonparametric test of Random Utility Models (RUM) using only nonsatiation and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) as restrictions on individual level behavior, allowing for fully unrestricted unobserved heterogeneity. The main application is the test of the null hypothesis that a sample of cross-sectional demand distributions was generated by a population of rational consumers. Thus, the paper provides a finite sample counterpart to the classic theoretical analysis of McFadden and Richter (1991) . To do so, it overcomes challenges in computation and in asymptotic theory and provides an empirical application to the U.K. Household Expenditure Survey. An econometric result of independent interest is a test for inequality constraints when they are represented in terms of the rays of a cone rather than its faces.
Introduction
This paper develops new tools for the analysis of Random Utility Models (RUM). The leading application is stochastic revealed preference theory, that is, the modeling of aggregate choice behavior in a population characterized by individual rationality and unobserved heterogeneity. We test the null hypothesis that a repeated cross-section of demand data was generated by such a population, without restricting unobserved heterogeneity in any form whatsoever. Equivalently, we empirically test McFadden and Richter's (1991) Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference (ARSP, to be defined later), using only nonsatiation and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) as restrictions on individual level behavior. Doing this is computationally challenging. We provide various algorithms that can be implemented with reasonable computational resources. Also, new tools for statistical inference for inequality restrictions are introduced in order to deal with the high-dimensionality and non-regularity of the problem at hand.
denote a random utility function. In our preferred interpretation, randomness of u represents unobserved heterogeneity across individuals.
1 Each consumer faces an income level and a price vector in R K + . Normalizing income to 1, the budget set for each consumer can be denoted as B(p), p ∈ R K + , and the consumer's choice is determined as y = arg max y∈B (p) u(y).
The econometrician observes a random sample of (y, p) . In other words, she observes (a sample analog of) choice probability Pr(y ∈ Y | price is p)
The question is whether (up to sampling uncertainty) these choice probabilities can be rationalized as an outcome of RUM. Our approach can be briefly described by the following steps:
• The first insight is that, although demand data are continuous, they can be discretized without any loss of information as long as the set of budgets is finite. Thus, a random utility model of demand on a finite set of budgets is really a model of discrete choice, though the number of distinct choice objects can be large (up to 67 in our empirical application in Section 8). The next steps of our approach immediately apply to choice problems that were discrete to begin with.
• If there is a finite list of discrete choice problems, then there is a finite list of rational "choice types." Each such type is uniquely characterized by a rationalizable nonstochastic choice pattern.
2 In realistic problem sizes, there are many such types (up to 177352 in our application), and obtaining the list is computationally challenging. Some techniques for efficiently computing the list are an important part of our contribution.
• Think of every rational choice type as defining a vector of degenerate choice probabilities over discrete choice objects. Then a corresponding vector of nondegenerate choice probabilities is 1 Random utility models were originally developed in mathematical psychology, and in principle, our results also apply to stochastic choice behavior by an individual. However, in these settings it would frequently be natural to impose much more structure than we do.
2 Note that we do not restrict the distribution of the utility function u to be discrete. It is the fundamental nature of our problem that enables us to convert it into a discrete problem, albeit a very high dimensional one.
consistent with a random utility model iff it is a convex combination of the degenerate ones.
We collect the latter into columns of a matrix; choice probabilities are then rationalizable iff they are in the column cone spanned by this matrix. The same insight informs our test statistic, which will be weighted Euclidean distance of estimated choice probabilities from this cone. In particular, it is computationally convenient to work with this cone and not the polytope that is generated by explicitly imposing that choice probabilities must be proper probabilities.
• The limiting distribution of the test statistic depends discontinuously on a high-dimensional nuisance parameter. Such features have been studied extensively in the literature on moment inequalities. However, our problem has characteristics which are not well studied in that literature. In particular, we will effectively test moment inequalities that jointly define a convex cone, and this cone will be represented in terms of its spanning rays rather than its faces. Moving from one representation to the other is computationally infeasible. We therefore use the representation of the cone that emerges naturally in our problem and "tighten" it for the purpose of bootstrap simulations. The procedure is similar in spirit to approaches proposed by Andrews and Soares (2010) , Bugni (2010) , Canay (2010) , and others. However, it is easy to implement in our application and, more generally, will have practical appeal whenever the representation of inequalities through a cone's spanning rays is natural.
In summary, the present paper contributes to the literature by (i) showing that McFadden and
Richter's ARSP, and in particular stochastic rationality of a population, can be tested nonparametrically, and developing computational tools to do so, and (ii) proposing a method based on "inequality tightening" that works well for inequality testing in some settings where standard methods as in Andrews and Soares (2010) or Bugni (2010) are hard to implement. We note that (ii) is also a contribution to specification testing of partially identified moment inequalities models more generally, namely in cases where the indirect moment inequalities as discussed here are the natural description of a model. We will also briefly explain how to carry out counterfactual analysis and intend to flesh out this part of the analysis in a companion paper.
Related Literature
In this section, we discuss the related literature on demand; related works in asymptotic theory are more easily discussed after setting up the corresponding framework. We first and foremost build on the classic literature on (deterministic and stochastic) revealed preference. Inspired by Samuelson's (1938) statement of the revealed preference paradigm, Houthakker (1950) , Afriat (1967; see also Varian (1982) ), and Richter (1966) delineated the precise content of utility maximization if one observes a single consumer's demand behavior. For our purposes, this content is embodied in the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP): The transitive closure of directly revealed preference must be acyclical.
3
This approach was extended to random utility maximization by Block and Marschak (1960), Falmagne (1978) , McFadden and Richter (1991), and McFadden (2005) . In particular, McFadden and Richter show that the precise content of random utility maximization -or equivalently, of individual level utility maximization in the presence of unrestricted, unobservable heterogeneity -is expressed by a collection of inequalities collectively dubbed "Axiom of Revealed Stochastic Preference" (ARSP).
These findings resolve this paper's questions "in the limit" when all identifiable quantities are known. In this idealized setting, they allow one to decide with certainty whether a given demand system or distribution of demands is rationalizable. In reality, estimators of these quantities might fail to be rationalizable because of sampling variation, and one can merely test the hypothesis that data might have been generated by a rational individual or population. For testing individual level rationality, such a test was proposed by Epstein and Yatchew (1985) . 4 To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first such test for ARSP.
Perhaps the closest paper to ours in spirit is Manski (2007) . In a simple, very abstract discrete choice problem (the universal set of options is a finite and, in practice, small list), he analyzes essentially the same question as we do. In particular, he states the testing and extrapolation problems in the abstract, solves them in simple examples, and outlines an approach to exact finite sample inference.
Further results for simple instances of the problem, including results on the degree of underidentification of choice types, were provided by Sher et al. (2011) . While we start from a continuous problem 3 The aforecited papers subtly differ in their handling of indifference. SARP characterizes rationality in the absence of indifference; else, it is sufficient but not necessary. Richter (1966) characterizes rationality if indifference is revealed through set-valued choice. The Afriat inequalities, or equivalently Varian's (1982) Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), characterize rationality if indifference is permitted but cannot be revealed through set-valued choice.
These differences do not matter in our setting. Observed choice is always unique, hence Richter's (1966) axiom collapses to SARP. Because nonsatiation will be assumed, GARP differs from SARP only with respect to choice objects that lie on the intersections of budget planes. With continuous demand on finitely many budgets, this case has zero probability (and does not occur in our data). In cases where these subtleties do matter, it would be easy to adopt our approach to any of these variations. 4 See also the survey by Cherchye et al. (2009) and recent work by Dean and Martin (2013) or Echenique et al. (2011) for other approaches to testing individual level rationality.
and use asymptotic theory rather than exact inference, the settings become similar after our initial discretization step. Our main contribution relative to these papers is to provide the computational toolkit, as well as asymptotic theory, to handle problems of realistic size. Indeed, this toolkit was recently employed for choice extrapolation by Manski (2013) .
In a series of influential papers, Crawford (2003, 2008 ; BBC henceforth) develop a nonparametric approach to demand analysis based on Engel curves. They assume the same observables as we do and apply their method to the British Family Expenditure Survey (FES), to which we apply our method as well in Section 8. The core difference to our approach is that BBC analyze one individual level demand system generated by nonparametric estimation of Engel curves.
This could be loosely characterized as revealed preference analysis of a representative consumer (and in practice, given their specific estimation technique, of average demand). One possible foundation for it was provided by Lewbel (2001) , who gives conditions on the random part of a random utility model that ensure integrability of expected demand. Lewbel's (2001) (Rose (1958) ), thus their corollary and ARSP must have the same specialization. This specialization is developed, and some implications are pointed out, in Stoye and Hoderlein (2013) . The latter paper contains no asymptotic theory, and the asymptotic theory in Hoderlein and Stoye (2013) is more closely related to the previous literature on moment inequalities than to this paper's innovation.
Finally, our approach can be usefully contrasted to the recently active literature on invertibility of demand, that is, on conditions under which individual demand can be backed out from observation of repeated cross-sections. See Beckert and Blundell (2007) , Berry, Gandhi, and Haile (2013) , and references therein. Unsurprisingly, invertibility requires substantial assumptions on structural parameters, i.e. utility functions and/or their distributions, which we avoid. The paper in this literature that is perhaps closest to ours is Blundell, Kristensen, and Matzkin (2011) , who investigate nonparametric extrapolation of demand and, compared to our setting, essentially add only invertibility. Other than by adding this assumption, their paper differs from ours by restricting attention to two goods. The extension of their approach to more than two goods is challenging; however, in the case of two goods, Stoye and Hoderlein (2013) show that their invertibility assumption is without loss of generality given the data structure.
Methodology
Following McFadden and Richter (1991) as well as many of the aforecited references, we presume a finite number of budgets parameterized by p ∈ {p 1 , ..., p J }. 5 Indexing the corresponding budget
, we can drop p from notation and write choice probability functions as
We only restrict individual consumers' behavior by monotonicity ("more is better") and SARP; equivalently, we assume that each consumer maximizes some nondecreasing utility function. 6 The only implication of monotonicity in our setting is that choices must be on (and not below) budget planes.
Thus, we assume that demand distributions are supported on the corresponding budget planes; more formally, π(y ∈ B j |B j ) = 1. The only implication of SARP is to restrict, in possibly very intricate ways, whether choice can simultaneously be above certain budgets and below others. In particular, consider two consumers a and b whose choices y a j and y b j are different but fulfil
In words, it is true for any (j, k) that consumer a's choice from budget j lies above budget k iff consumerb's choice from budget j does. Then it must be the case that either both consumers fulfil SARP or both violate it. For the purpose of testing our random utility model, we can take the two consumers to form an equivalence class.
This insight means that, while the space of choices Y ⊂ R K + is generally unrestricted and is continuous in our application, it can be discretized without loss of generality. Doing so requires some 5 The theory was extended to the continuous case in McFadden (2005) , and we discuss prospects for the corresponding extension of our approach in the conclusion. 6 In a setting characterized by choice from linear budgets, this is furthermore equivalent to assuming maximization of strictly concave utility (Varian (1982) 
for every j, and also that for any k = 1, ..., J, any i = 1, ..., I j , and any y 1 , y 2 ∈ x i|j , one has
is the coarsest such partition. Henceforth, we use the word "patch" to denote a generic element x i|j of X . For the simplest nontrivial example, let there be J = 2 budgets that intersect, then there is a total of four patches: two on B 1 , where one is above B 2 and the other one is below it, and two patches on B 2 , where one is above B 1 and one is below it. Then the random utility model intricately restricts the probabilities of patches π(y ∈ x i|j |B j ), but it does not at all restrict the conditional distributions of demand on patches.
We can, therefore, work with choice space X , effectively discretizing the choice problem to one with a total of I := ∑ J j=1 I J choice objects and corresponding choice probabilities. This leaves us with a large (in applications of practical interest) but finite set of distinct nonstochastic choice types.
We will now explain how to efficiently encode these. To do so, arrange X as a vector
and similarly write
then the I-vector π contains all information that is relevant for testing RUM.
Any conceivable pattern of nonstochastic choice behavior can be identified with a binary I- It is easy to see that Hypothesis (H B ) is, in turn, equivalent to
where Ω is a positive definite matrix (restricted to be diagonal in our inference procedure) and C := {Aν|ν ≥ 0}. Note that the constraint set C is a cone in R I . The solution η 0 of (H C ) is the projection of π ∈ R I + onto C under the weighted norm ∥x∥ Ω = √ x ′ Ωx. The corresponding value of the objective function is the squared length of the projection residual vector. The projection η 0 is unique, but the corresponding ν is not. Stochastic rationality holds if and only if the length of the residual vector is zero.
A natural sample counterpart of the objective function in (H C ) would be min
whereπ estimates π, for example by sample choice frequencies. It is useful to normalize this sample counterpart by N to obtain an appropriate asymptotic distribution, so define
Once again, ν is not unique at the optimum, but η = Aν is. Call its optimal valueη, noting that η can also be thought of as rationality-constrained estimator of choice probabilities. Thenη =π, and J N = 0, iff the estimated choice probabilitiesπ are stochastically rational; obviously, our null hypothesis will be accepted in this case. To determine an appropriate critical value for our test, we will have to estimate the distribution of J N . This estimation problem is intricate and will be handled in section 5.
Computation
We now turn to computational implementation of the approach. The challenge is threefold:
First, how to encode the choice set X ; second, how to generate the matrix A; last, how to carry out the constrained minimization in the definition of J N . We explain our response to these issues in this order.
4.1. Encoding X . Geometrically, the patches x i|j are polyhedra with rather complex descriptions.
However, the only information that matters for computing A is how any given patch relates to the different budgets. To implement this insight, we switch from the double index expression X =
to a a single index i = 1, ..., I and write X = {x i } I i=1 in the remainder of this section. Now, let
then we can represent each x i by the vector
The choice set is represented by the (I × J)-matrix X=
Our algorithm for generating X from budget data (p 1 , ..., p J ) is as follows: First, generate all J × 2 J−1 possible vectors X i of the form just described. Not all of these will encode patches that actually exist in the given choice problem; in particular, some of them will define intersections of half-spaces that do not occur in the positive quadrant. Thus, test the validity of each vector and append it to X only if the test is passed. To illustrate this step, suppose that J = 5 with K goods and that we want to verify whether the patch encoded by (0, −1, 1, 1, 1) exists. It is easy to see that this is the case iff the system
has a solution. Several numerical solvers can quickly verify consistency of a set of linear inequality constraints. Using the cvx optimization package (Grant and Boyd (2008, 2011) ), we find that checking the above inequalities is computationally inexpensive even for high dimensional commodity spaces. and x m are on the same budget plane; X mj = −1 ⇒ x i ≻ x m follows by additional uses of "more is better" and transitivity because x i was chosen over some patch that dominates x m . In a second step, acyclicity of a given set of revealed preferences can be checked by the Floyd-Warshall algorithm, efficient implementations of which are readily available.
7 If this computation were a bottleneck, it could be refined along the lines of the decision tree crawling algorithm discussed in the next subsection. However, computation of A is the much harder step.
We implemented three ways to generate A.
8 First, a "brute force" approach initially creates
-matrix A max that represents all possible choice combinations from J budgets. Every column of A max is then checked for rationality. This approach, which resembles our computation of X, has the benefit of being straightforward and of also collecting irrational types, which can be handy for simulations. However, the number of columns of A max grows extremely rapidly as budgets are added, and the brute force approach is not practical in realistic examples, including this paper's empirical application.
Our second approach is a "decision tree crawling" algorithm. Here, the core insight is that all possible choice patterns can be associated with terminal nodes of a decision tree whose initial node corresponds to choice from B 1 , the next set of nodes to choice from B 2 , and so on. The algorithm exhaustively crawls this tree, checking for choice cycles at every node that is visited and abandoning the entire branch whenever a cycle is detected. A column of A is discovered every time that a terminal node is visited without detecting a cycle. The abandoning of branches means that most nonrationalizable choice patterns are never visited. For example, if a cycle is detected after specifying behavior on 4 out of 10 budgets, then none of the many possible completions of this choice pattern are considered. The downside is more frequent (for any rational pattern that is detected) execution of the Floyd-Warshall algorithm, but this algorithm is cheap (it terminates in polynomial time). The net effect is to improve computation time by orders of magnitude in complicated problems. Indeed, this is our most powerful algorithm that is directly applicable "off the shelf" in every application of our approach.
Finally, a modest amount of problem-specific adjustment can lead to further, dramatic improvement in many cases, including our empirical application. The key to this is contained in the following proposition, which is established in appendix A. This proposition is helpful whenever not all budgets mutually intersect. To exploit it in applications, one must manually check for such sets of budgets and possibly be willing to reorder budgets.
The benefit is that if the proposition applies, all rationalizable choice patterns can be discovered by checking for rationalizable choice patterns on smaller domains and then combining the results. In par- step.) Every combination of two such completions is itself a rationalizable choice pattern. Note that no step in this algorithm checks rationality on J budgets at once; furthermore, a Cartesian product structure of the set of rationalizable choice patterns is exploited. The potential benefit is substantial -in our application, the refinement sometimes improves computation times by orders of magnitude.
Computation of J N is a quadratic programming problem subject to a possibly large number of linear inequality constraints. We have nothing to add to the theory of solving such problems and rely on modern numerical solvers that can handle high-dimensional quadratic programming problems. Our currently preferred implementation utilizes cvx. We also implemented computation of J N with fmincon (using stepwise quadratic programming) and Knitro. All solvers agree on those problems that they can handle, with fmincon being practical only for rather small problem sizes.
4.4. Summary. As we will demonstrate in Section 8, the above algorithms for computation of X, A, and J N can be executed for high-dimensional problems. However, we will now illustrate by very briefly going over the simplest nontrivial example, i.e. two budgets which intersect. In this case J = 2 and I 1 = I 2 = 2, yielding I = 4 patches, and we have
Here, the first row of X represents the part of budget B 1 that is below B 2 and so on. Rows of A corresponds to rows of X, whereas its columns correspond to types. Thus, the first column of A indicates the rational choice type whose choice from B 1 is below B 2 but whose choice from B 2 is above B 1 . There are four logically possible choice types, but one of them, namely [1, 0, 1, 0] ′ , would violate WARP and is therefore not represented in A. Given an estimator π = ( π 1 , π 2 , π 3 , π 4 ) ′ for π and setting Ω = I 2 , one can then verify that J N = N · (max{ π 1 + π 3 − 1, 0}) 2 . In particular, the test statistic J N is zero if π 1 + π 3 ≤ 1, and in that case we immediately conclude that the data are consistent with the random utility model.
The example reproduces the known finding (Matzkin (2006) , Hoderlein and Stoye (2013) ) that with two budgets, the content of stochastic rationality is exhausted by the restriction "π 1 + π 3 ≤ 1" on population choice probabilities. However, the tools proposed here allow one to perform similar computations for very complicated examples. Think of the size of A, that is, "number of patches × number of rational choice types," as an indicator of problem complexity. Then the example just given has size (4 × 3). For our empirical application, we successfully computed A, and computed J N 2000 times, in cases where A has size (67 × 149570) respectively (64 × 177352). The computational bottlenecks in implementation are twofold: Computation of A took several hours in some cases (although reduced to minutes using proposition 4.1), and computation of J N (which must be iterated over to compute critical values) took up to a minute.
Inference
This section discusses inferential procedures to deal with the hypothesis (H A ) or its equivalent forms. We initially assume that choice probabilities were estimated by sample frequencies. For each budget j, denote the choices of N j individuals, indexed by n = 1, ..., N j , from the budget set B j , by
Assume that one observes J random samples {{d i|j,n }
An obvious way to estimate the vector π is to use choice frequencies
Our main task is to estimate the sampling distribution of representation of the cone C in the literature on convex geometry (see, e.g., Ziegler (1995) ). Unfortunately, a V-representation is not useful in detecting whetherη is close to an irregular point or not. (Irregular points occur close to the spanning rays of the cone, but because many vectors ν correspond to the same projectionη, we may not be able to diagnose this from the ν that we discovered.)
Thus, an alternative description of C in terms of η has to be obtained. Weyl's Theorem guarantees that that is possible theoretically: If a set C in R J is represented as cone(A), A ∈ R I×H , we can write
The last line is called an H-representation of C.
9 Applying Weyl to the definition of J N , one can obtain J N = min
where the optimal t (:=t) is unique.
On a theoretical level, this connects our testing problem to tests of
based on test statistics of form
This type of problem has been studied by Gourieroux, Holly and Monfort (1982) and Wolak (1991) .
See also Chernoff (1954) , Kudo (1963) , Perlman (1969) , Shapiro (1988) , Kuriki and Takemura (2000) , Andrews (2001) , Rosen (2008) , and Guggenberger, Hahn, and Kim (2008) . 10 A common way to get a critical value for T N is to consider the least favorable case, which is θ = 0. This strategy is 9 The converse is also true and known as Minkowski's Theorem. See Gruber (2007) , Grünbaum (2003) 
where S is the asymptotic covariance matrix. LetŜ denote a consistent estimator for S. Then regularization is easy to imple-
, where α N is a sequence that goes to infinity slowly. Recall thatη is the projection of the choice frequency vectorπ onto the cone C. The random variableη α N is essentially a subsampled or m-out-of-n bootstrapped version ofη. The distribution of
can be evaluated by simulation. It provides a valid approximation of the distribution of J N asymptotically, regardless of the position of η 0 , the population analog ofη, on the cone C. This is basically the idea behind subsampling and the m-out-of-n bootstrap. It is convenient computationally, but Guggenberger (2009, 2010) forcefully argue that it can suffer from severe conservatism.
The second approach, i.e. inequality selection, is essentially the Generalized Moment Selection procedure for moment inequality models (see, e.g., Andrews and Soares (2010) , Bugni (2010) ). Let κ N be a sequence that diverges slowly to infinity.
11 Let b 1 , ..., b m be the row vectors of B. Suppose 
Lett select denote the minimizer and defineη
offers a valid approximation to the distribution of J N . This is expected to work well in finite samples, but is computationally infeasible in the present context. To our knowledge, implementing Weyl's
Theorem to obtain an H-representation out of the V-representation is done by repeated application of (some variation of) the Fourier-Motzkin elimination algorithm, which is notoriously difficult when the dimension of ν is high. This is exactly the case for the problem considered in this subsection, even for a small number of budgets.
We therefore propose an "inequality tightening" approach that sidesteps the need for an Hrepresentation of C, making it simple to implement and applicable to problems of a realistic size. The idea is to tighten the constraint by replacing
for some positive scalar τ N that declines to zero slowly. (In principle, the vector 1 H could be any strictly positive H-vector, though a data based choice of such a vector is beyond the scope of the paper.) Now solve
where C τ N := {Aν|ν ≥ τ N 1 H }, and letη τ N denote the solution. Our proof establishes that constraints that are almost binding at the original problem's solution (i.e., their slack is difficult to be distinguished from zero at the sample size) will be binding with zero slack after tightening.
Notice that, as in the inequality selection procedure, no regularization (or subsampling/mout-of-n bootstrapping) is necessary at this stage. Finally, definẽ
and use its distribution to approximate that of J N . This has the same theoretical justification as the inequality selection procedure. Unlike the latter, however, it avoids the use of an H-representation, thus offering a computationally feasible empirical testing procedure for stochastic rationality. We now turn to providing a detailed justification for the method.
First, recall that we tighten the constraint set C using its V-representation. The next lemma, among other things, shows that this corresponds to a strict tightening of its H-representation, even though direct computation of the latter is infeasible. For a matrix B, let col(B) denote its column space.
Lemma 5.1. For a τ > 0 and a matrix A ∈ R I×H , define
Then C τ can be alternatively written as
This is different from the Minkowski-Weyl theorem for polyhedra, which would provide an expression of C τ as the Minkowski sum of a convex hull and a non-negative hull. Lemma 5.1 is useful for proving the asymptotic validity of our procedure.
The following assumption is used for our asymptotic theory. 
Consider the following requirement:
Note that the distribution of observations is uniquely characterized by the vector π. Let P denote the set of all π's that satisfy Condition 5.1 for some (common) value of ϵ. Finally, we note that the method works because tightening the cone can only turn non-binding inequalities from the H-representation into binding ones but not vice versa. This feature is not universal to cones. Our proof establishes that it generally obtains if Ω is the identity matrix and all corners of the cone are acute. In this paper's application, we can further exploit the cone's geometry to extend the result to any diagonal Ω. Our method immediately applies to other V-representations if analogous features can be verified.
Bootstrap Algorithm with Tightening
This section details how to simulate the distribution of J N with a bootstrap procedure that employs Theorem 5.1. First, we apply the standard nonparametric bootstrap to obtain resampled unrestricted choice probability vector estimatesπ * (r) , r = 1, ..., R, where R denotes the number of bootstrap replications. This provides the bootstrap distribution estimate as the distribution ofπ * (r) − π, r = 1, ..., R, where, as before,π denotes the unrestricted choice probability vector. We need to generate the bootstrap samples under the null, however. A naive way to achieve this would be to center it around the restricted estimatorη, that iŝ
Recall thatη is the solution to
Butπ * naive is invalid due to standard results about the failure of the bootstrap in discontinuous models (e.g., Andrews (2000) ). The "tightening" remedy is to center it instead around the tightened restricted estimator. More precisely, our procedure is as follows: (i) Obtain the τ N -tightened restricted estimatorη τn , which solves
(ii) Calculate the bootstrap estimators under the restriction, using the recentering factorη τn obtained in (i):π * (r) τn :=π * (r) −π +η τn , r = 1, ..., R.
(iii) Calculate the bootstrap test statistic by solving the following problem:
for r = 1, ..., R.
(iv) Use the empirical distribution of J * (r)
N (τ N ), r = 1, ..., R to obtain the critical value for J N .
This method relies on a tuning parameter τ N which plays the role of a similar tuning parameter in the moment selection approach (namely, the parameter labeled κ N in Andrews and Soares (2010) ).
In a simplified procedure in which the unrestricted choice probability estimate is obtained by simple sample frequencies, one reasonable choice would be
where N is the minimum of the 'sample size' across budgets: N = min j N j (N j is the number of observations on Budget B j : see (5.1)). The logarithmic penalization corresponds to the Bayes Information Criterion. The use of N can probably be improved upon, but suffices to ensure validity of our inference.
Test statistic with smoothing
In our empirical analysis in Section 8, the estimatorπ is a standard kernel estimator, so the above formula needs to be modified. Let h N (j) be the bandwidth applied to Budget B j . Then an appropriate choice of τ N is obtained by replacing N j in the definition above with the "effective sample size" N j h N (j). That is:
where N h = min j N j h N (j). Strictly speaking, asymptotics with nonparametric smoothing involve bias, and the bootstrap does not solve the problem. A standard procedure is to claim that one used undersmoothing and can hence ignore the bias. We follow this convention.
To formally state the asymptotic theory behind our procedure with smoothing, let x(j) denote the median (log) income levels for year j. We observe J random samples
Instead of sample frequency estimators, we usê
(note the index j in d i|j,n now refers to year), where x n (j) is the log income of person n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N j observed in year j. The kernel function K is assumed to be symmetric about zero, to integrate to 1, and to satisfy ∫ |K(z)|dz < ∞ and ∫ z 2 K(z)dz < ∞. Needless to say,π i|j is a standard kernel regression estimator for
where
As before, we write π j := (π 1|j , ..., π I j |j ) ′ and π :
The smoothed version of J N is computed using the above kernel estimator forπ in (3.1). We also replace the normalizing factor N with N min j h N (j), which is convenient for asymptotic analysis. Likewise, J N (τ N ) is obtained applying the same replacements to the formula (5.2), although generatingη τ N requires a slight modification. Letη τ N (j) be the j-th block of the vectorη τ N , andŜ j be a consistent estimator for the asymptotic variance of
Letḣ (ḧ) denote the first (second) derivative of a function h. Recall that the modulus of continuity of h defined on R at x 0 is given by 
(iii) x n (j) is continuously distributed with density f j , and f j (x(j)) ≥ ϵ for every 1 ≤ j ≤ J;
In what follows, F j signifies the joint distribution of (d i|j,n , x n (j)). Let F be the set of all (F 1 , ..., F J ) that satisfy Condition 7.1 for some (ϵ, K, ρ(·)).
Corollary 7.1. Choose τ N and h
N (j), j = 1, ..., J so that τ N ↓ 0, h N (j) = o(N − 1 5 ) and √ N min j h N (j)τ N ↑
∞. Also let Ω be diagonal where all the diagonal elements are positive. Then under Assumption 5.1 lim inf
The proof of Corollary 7.1 resembles the proof of Theorem 5.1, except that the asymptotic normality proof in Bierens (1987, Section 2.2) and Condition 7.1 are used to obtain triangular array CLT's and uniform consistency results.
Empirical Application
We apply our methods to data from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey, the same data used by Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2008, BBC henceforth) . To facilitate comparison of results, we use the same subset of these data as they do, namely the time periods from 1975 through 1999, households with a car and at least one child, and also the same composite goods, namely food, nondurable consumption goods, and services (with total expenditure on the three standing in for income).
For each year, we extract the budget corresponding to that year's median expenditure. We estimate the distribution of demand on that budget by kernel density estimation applied to budget shares, where the kernel is normal, the bandwidth is chosen according to Silverman's rule of thumb, and the underlying distance metric is log(income). Like BBC, we assume that all consumers in one year face the same prices, and we use their price data. While budgets have a tendency to move outward over time, we find that there is substantial overlap of budgets. Thus, our analysis is not subject to the frequently reported problem that revealed preference tests are near vacuous because income gains dominate relative price changes. At the same time, the tendency of budgets to move outward means that budgets which are more than a few years apart rarely overlap, making the refinement of our crawling algorithm via Proposition 4.1 very powerful in this application.
It is computationally prohibitive to test stochastic rationality on 25 periods at once. We work with all possible sets of eight consecutive periods, a problem size that can be very comfortably Table 1 . We find that J N = 0 in only one case; that is, only in one case are the estimated choice probabilities rationalizable. However, violations of stochastic rationality are by and large not significant. We get one p-value below 10%, illustrating that in principle our test has some power, though this p-value must of course be seen in the context of the multiple hypothesis tests reported in p-values were computed from two subsets of data that overlap in seven of eight periods. Our overall conclusion is that observed choice probabilities differ from rationalizable ones but not significantly so.
Further Applications and Extensions
9.1. Partial Identification of ν. Our setting gives rise to an identified set H ν for weights ν over rational choice types
and our main test could be interpreted as a specification test for the null hypothesis H 0 :
Estimation of H ν is, therefore, a natural issue. We focus on it somewhat less because the identified set is a collection of distributions over lists of choice behaviors and, at least in our application, is not If our model is misspecified, then H ν is empty. To generate an estimand that is nonempty by construction, define
This set is independent of the choice of the weighting matrix Ω (as long as Ω is positive definite), and then coincides with H ν as previously defined, iff the latter is nonempty. But it also defines a coherent notion of "pseudo-true (partially identified) distribution of rational types" if the data are not rationalizable.
H ν is a singleton iff ν is point identified, which will rarely be the case in interesting applications of our framework. Indeed, in our application, H ν (Ω) is a high-dimensional, convex polyhedron even in cases where π is not rationalizable. That is, unlike in many other applications of moment inequalities, failure of the sample criterion function to attain a minimal value of zero does not make the sample analog of the identified set a singleton.
Explicit computation of H ν (Ω) is demanding. Our suggestion is to write
and compute a plug-in estimator that replaces π with π. Noting that we showed how to compute the inner minimum, computation of these estimators could utilize methods based on support vector machines as developed in current work by Bar and Molinari (2012) . An appropriately modified version of the method described in Sections 5 and 6 can be applied to inference on H ν or elements of H ν , though we leave its detailed analysis for future research.
Partial Identification of Counterfactual Choices.
The toolkit developed in this paper is also useful for counterfactual analysis. At the most general level, to bound the value of any function f (ν) subject to the constraint that ν rationalizes the observed data, solve the program
recalling thatη =π wheneverπ is rationalizable. 13 Some interesting applications emerge by restricting attention to linear functions f (ν) = e ′ ν, in which case the bounds are furthermore relatively easy to compute because the program is linear. We briefly discuss bounding demand under a counterfactual 13 Equivalently, one could use the previous subsection's notation to write
which is more similar to the way that similar problems are stated by Manski (e.g., Manski (2007) ).
budget, e.g. in order to measure the impact of policy intervention. This is close in spirit to bounds reported by Blundell et al. (2008; see also Cherchye et al. (2009) and references therein) as well as Manski (2007 Manski ( , 2013 .
In this subsection only, assume that demand on budget B J is not observed but is to be bounded.
and let e i signify the i-th unit vector. We will begin by bounding components of the vector π J .
Corollary 9.1. π i|J is bounded by
In this paper's application, the patches x i|J , and hence the probabilities π i|J , are not of intrinsic interest. However, they might be the object of interest in applications where the choice problem was discrete to begin with. Indeed, the above is the bounding problem further analyzed in Sher at al. 
with components
thus these vectors list minimal respectively maximal consumption of good k on the different patches
) is a linear programming exercise. Then we have:
Corollary 9.2. Expected demand for good k on budget B J is bounded by
Finally, consider bounding the c.d.f. F k (z) = Pr(y k ≤ z). This quantity must be bounded in two steps. The event (y k ≤ z) will in general not correspond to a precise set of patches, that is, it is not measurable with respect to (the algebra generated by) {x 1|J , ...,
will derive from an upper bound on the joint probability of all patches x i|J s.t. y k ≤ z holds for some y ∈ x i|J . Similarly, a lower bound will derive from bounding the joint probability of all patches x i|J s.t. y k ≤ z holds for all y ∈ x i|J . 14 We thus have:
and from above by
While both the lower and the upper bound, seen as functions of z, will themselves be proper c.d.f.'s, they are not in general feasible distributions of demand for y k . That is, the bounds are sharp pointwise but not uniformly. Also, bounds on a wide range of parameters such as the variance of demand follow from the above bounds on the c.d.f. through results in Stoye (2010) . However, because the bounds on the c.d.f. are not uniform, these derived bounds will be valid but not necessarily sharp.
When trained on this paper's empirical application, these bounds are uncomfortably wide, motivating the search for nonparametric refinements that lead to narrower bounds without tightly 14 These definitions correspond to inner and outer measure, as well as to hitting and containment probability.
constraining heterogeneity. This search, as well as the development of inference procedures for the bounds, are the subject of ongoing research. We also note that in his recent analysis of optimal taxation of labor, Manski (2013) uses our computational tools to find informative bounds.
9.3. Choice from Binary Sets. The methods developed in this paper, including the two extensions just discussed, immediately apply to nonparametric analysis of random discrete choice. Indeed, the initial discretization step that characterizes our analysis of a demand system is superfluous in this case. We briefly elaborate on one salient application that has received attention in the literature, namely the case where choice probabilities for pairs of options,
are observed for all pairs of choice objects {a, b} drawn from some finite, universal set A.
Finding abstract conditions under which a set of choice probabilities {π ab : a, b ∈ A} is rationalizable has been the objective of two large, disjoint literatures, one in economics and one in operations research. See Fishburn (1992) for a survey of these literatures and Manski (2007) for a recent discussion of the substantive problem. There exists a plethora of necessary conditions, most famously Marschak's (1960) triangle condition, which can be written as
This condition is also sufficient for rationalizability if A contains at most 5 elements (Dridi (1980) ).
Conditions that are both necessary and sufficient in general have proved elusive. We do not discover abstract such conditions either, but provide the toolkit to numerically resolve the question in complicated cases, including a statistical test that applies whenever probabilities are estimated rather than perfectly observed. To see this, define J = (#A)(#A − 1)/2 "budgets" that correspond to distinct pairs a, b ∈ A, and let the vector X (of length I = 2J) stack these budgets, where the ordering of budgets is arbitrary and options within a budget are ordered according to a preassigned ordering on A. Each rational type (and thus, column of the matrix A) then corresponds to an ordering of the elements of A and can be characterized by a binary I-vector with just the same interpretation as before. As before, an I-vector of choice probabilities π whose components correspond to components of X is rationalizable iff Aν = π for some ν ∈ ∆ H−1 . All methods developed in this paper apply immediately.
To illustrate, let A = {a, b, c}, then one can write 
and it is readily verified that Aν = π for some ν ∈ ∆ 5 iff both π ab +π bc +π ca ≤ 2 and π cb +π ba +π ac ≤ 2, confirming sufficiency of the triangle condition. More generally, the matrix A has H = (#A)! columns.
This limits computational feasibility of our approach, but note that the set of orderings of elements of A is easily characterized, so that computation time per column of A will be low.
Conclusion
This paper presented asymptotic theory and computational tools for nonparametric testing of Random Utility Models. Again, the null to be tested was that data were generated by a RUM, interpreted as describing a heterogeneous population, where the only restrictions imposed on individuals'
behavior were "more is better" and SARP. In particular, we allowed for unrestricted, unobserved heterogeneity and stopped far short of assumptions that would recover invertibility of demand. As a result, the distribution over utility functions in the population is left (very) underidentified. We
showed that testing the model is nonetheless possible. The method is easily adapted to choice problems that are discrete to begin with, and one can easily impose more, or also fewer, restrictions at the individual level.
Possibilities for extensions and refinements abound. We close by mentioning some salient issues.
(1) The methods discussed in this section are computationally intensive. The proposed algorithms work for a reasonably sized problem, though it is important to make further improvements in the algorithms if one wishes to deal with a problem that is large, say in terms of the number of budgets.
(2) We restricted attention to finite sets of budgets. The extension to infinitely many budgets would be of obvious interest. Theoretically, it can be handled by considering an appropriate discretization argument (McFadden (2005)). For the proposed projection-based econometric methodology, such an extension requires evaluating choice probabilities locally over points in the space of p via nonparametric smoothing, then use the choice probability estimators in the calculation of the J N statistic. The asymptotic theory then needs to be modified. Another approach that can mitigate the computational constraint is to consider a partition of the space of p such that R K + = P 1 ∪ P 2 · · · ∪ P M . Suppose we calculate the J N statistic for each of these partitions. Given the resulting M statistics, say
N or a weighted average of them. These extensions and their formal statistical analysis are of practical interest.
(3) It might frequently be desirable to control for observable covariates to guarantee the homogeneity of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. Once again, this requires incorporating nonparametric smoothing in estimating choice probabilities, then averaging the corresponding J N statistics over the covariates. This extension will be pursued.
(4)
The econometric techniques outlined here can be potentially useful in much broader contexts.
Again, our proposed hypothesis test can be regarded as specification test for a moment inequalities model. The proposed statistic J N is an inequality analogue of goodness-of-fit statistics such as Hansen's (1982) overidentifying restrictions test statistic. Existing proposals for specification testing in moment inequality models (Andrews and Guggenberger (2009) , Andrews and Soares (2010) , Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2013) , Romano and Shaikh (2008) ) use a similar test statistic but work with H-representations. In settings in which theoretical restrictions inform a V-representation of a cone, the H-representation will typically not be available in practice. We expect that our method can be used in many such cases.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin with some preliminary observations. Throughout this proof, c(B i ) denotes the object actually chosen from budget B i .
(i) If there is a choice cycle of any finite length, then there is a cycle of length 2 or 3 (where a cycle of length 2 is a WARP violation). To see this, assume there exists a length N choice cycle Letting ν τ = ν − τ 1 H , we have
where ⊕ signifies Minkowski sum. Define
Using the H-representation of C,
Note that the above definition of ϕ implies ϕ ∈ col(B). Also define
and let e h be the h-th standard unit vector in R H . Since e h ≥ 0, the V-representation of C implies that Ae h ∈ C, and thus
But unless we have the case of rank(B) = 1 (in which case the proof is trivial) it cannot be that
are non-negative, we conclude that
for all k. We now have
where the strict vector inequality is meant to hold element-by-element.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By applying the Minkowski-Weyl theorem and Lemma 5.1 to
we see that our procedure is equivalent to comparing
to the 1 − α quantile of the distribution of
with ϕ ∈ R m ++ , whereη
Suppose B has m rows and rank(B) = ℓ. Define an ℓ × m matrix K such that KB is a matrix whose rows consist of a basis of the row space row(B). Also let M be an (I − ℓ) × I matrix whose rows form an orthonormal basis of kerB = ker(KB), and define
. Finally, letĝ = Bπ andĥ = Mπ.
) .
Also define
where col(B) denotes the column space of B.
be an arbitrary element of U 2 . We can always find t * ∈ R I such that Kγ * = KBt * .
Define
is an element of U 1 as well. Consequently,
We now have
and t(x) := min
It is easy to see that t : R ℓ → R + is a positive definite quadratic form. We can write
We now show that tightening can turn non-binding inequality constraints into binding ones but not vice versa. Note that, as will be seen below, this observation uses diagonality of Ω and the specific geometry of the cone C. Letγ k τ N ,ĝ k and ϕ k denote the k-th elements ofγ τ N = Bη τ N ,ĝ and ϕ.
Finally, define β τ (g) = γ τ (g) + τ ϕ for τ > 0 and let β k τ (g) denote its k-th element. Now we show that for each k and for some δ > 0,
In what follows we first show this for the case with Ω = I I , where I I denotes the I-dimensional identity matrix, then generalize the result to the case where Ω can have arbitrary positive diagonal elements.
For τ > 0 define hyperplanes
and half spaces
and also let
In what follows we show that for small enough δ > 0, every element x * ∈ R I such that
Thus in order to establish the desired property of the function β τ (·), we show that (11.2) implies (11.3). Suppose it does not hold; then without loss of generality, for an element x * that satisfies (11.2) for an arbitrary small δ > 0, we have
then for (11.4) to hold for some x * ∈ R I satisfying (11.2) for an arbitrary small δ > 0 we must have
(Recall the notation | signifies orthogonal projection. Also note that if dim(F) = 1, then F = ∩ q j=1 H τ j , and (11.4) does not occur.) Therefore if we let
i.e. the simplex with vertices (J, 0,
Let {a 1 , ..., a H } = A denote the collection of the column vectors of A. Then {the vertices of F ∩
holds for small enough ε > 0. Letā τ :=ā + τ ,ā τ :=ā + τ , then
By construction z ∈ C, which implies the existence of a triplet (a,ā,ā) of distinct elements in A such
In what follows we show that this cannot happen, then the desired property of β τ is established.
So let us now show that
Noting that a ′ i a j just counts the number of budgets on which i and j agree, define
the number of disagreements. Importantly, note that ϕ(a i , a j ) = ϕ(a j , a i ) and that ϕ is a distance (it is the taxicab distance between elements in A, which are all 0-1 vectors). Now
by the triangle inequality.
Next we treat the case where Ω is not necessarily I I . Write
The statistic J N in (3.1) can be rewritten, using the square-root matrix Ω 1/2 ,
Then we can follow our previous argument replacing a's with a * 's, and using
., I).
instead of the simplex ∆(J). Finally, we need to verify that the acuteness condition (11.6) holds for 
which is the desired acuteness condition. Since J N can be written as the minimum of the quadratic form with identity-matrix weighting subject to the cone generated by a * 's, all the previous arguments developed for the case with Ω = I I remain valid.
Defining ξ ∼ N(0,Ŝ) and ζ = Bξ,
Moreover, defining γ τ = γ + τ N ϕ in the above, and using the definitions of β τ (·) and s(·)
, then from the property of β τ shown above, Before stating the proof of Corollary 7.1, let us introduce some notation. 
Also let f (j)
F denote the density of x n (j) under F .
Note that Σ (j) 
By the standard change of variable argument
F (x(j)) + Σ ) for such j where v N,n (i|j) denotes the i-th element of the I j random vector v N,n (j). Note that s N ≍ N j , and therefore proceeding as in the derivation of (11.9), then using Equation (2.2.10) in Bierens (1987) we obtain (11.10) 1 s
for 1 ≤ i ≤ I j . By (11.8), (11.9) and (11.10), we have
Finally, the convergence results corresponding (2.2.4) and (2.2.5) in Bierens (1987) hold under the sequence of distributions {F N } ∞ N =1 as specified above, once again by proceeding as in the derivation of (11.9). It follows that
The rest is the same as the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
Appendix B: Algorithms for Computing

Algorithm 2: Decision Tree Crawling
An intuition for this algorithm is as follows. All possible choice patterns can be arranged on one decision tree, where the first node refers to choice from B 1 and so forth. The tree is systematically crawled. Exploration of any branch is stopped as soon as a choice cycle is detected. Completion of a rationalizable choice pattern is detected when a terminal node has been reached.
Pseudo-code for this algorithm follows.
